Security & privacy

An honest summary of what the product does today.

What it does today

Local-first: client data lives on your machine in an encrypted SQLCipher database; the audit trail is a separate encrypted database.
Evidence files encrypted at rest.
Sign-in with the platform authenticator (Touch ID on macOS; Windows Hello on Windows).
Roles (Admin, Analyst, Auditor, Viewer) with segregation of duties.
Single-use recovery codes; account lockout after failed attempts; re-authentication for sensitive actions.
7-year audit-log retention with Auditor-gated purge; cryptographic erasure when a project is deleted.
Assessed internally against CIS Controls v8, Implementation Group 1 (IG1), and run through static and dynamic scans in September 2026.

What we do not claim

These are internal assessments, not third-party certifications or audits.
The Certificate of Self-Assessment carries a SHA-256 content integrity hash; it is not a digital signature or a legal certification.
The application does not guarantee legal compliance: it supports documentation and assessment.

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Architecture & threat model

User

Tauri WebView: untrusted UIContent-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' · connect-src ipc: onlyno inline or eval'd script

Rust core: trustedCapability grant: core:default + dialog:default onlyno filesystem, shell-exec or HTTP-client permission for the UI

Local databaseSQLCipher: AES-256 at rest(a FIPS-approved algorithm)

OS key vaultWindows DPAPI / macOS Keychainkey never plaintext on disk

Platform authenticatorWindows Hello / Touch IDno password the app sees or stores

Ports: none listening · the only outbound connection is HTTPS (TLS) to one fixed origin, to fetch signed updates. Every download is verified (Ed25519 + SHA-256) before use, and the application never patches itself.

The interface is treated as hostile by design: it can reach the Rust core only through the small set of IPC commands the application registers, and only within the capability grant shown above. No component opens a listening port; internal “traffic” means in-process function calls and local file I/O, not network hops. Update connections are made by the Rust core, never by the interface.

Data at rest is protected two ways at once: the database is SQLCipher-encrypted, and the key that unlocks it is held in the operating system’s protected vault. So a copied database file is useless without also compromising that specific OS account. Sign-in runs through the platform’s own biometric hardware.

These values were verified against the application’s configuration (tauri.conf.json and capabilities/default.json), not assumed.

If files or a computer are stolen

Copying a project’s files to another computer does not give access to the data.

The key that opens the database is not in the files. It is held in the operating system’s protected store (Windows DPAPI, bound to the Windows account; or the macOS login Keychain), and the project’s keyfile holds only a reference to it.
If someone copies the database, the evidence and the keyfile to another machine, the key is not there: the project cannot be opened and access to the database is denied.
Even on the original machine, opening a project requires Touch ID (macOS) or Windows Hello (Windows).

What you should know

The recovery code exists for a lost computer and can open the project on another computer together with the files. Keep it separate and offline, never with the computer. It is single-use: using it issues a new one.
A stolen computer that is already unlocked, with the user signed in, is protected only by the computer’s own security. We recommend full-disk encryption, a screen lock and signing out.

Cryptography

The algorithms that protect the database and evidence files are FIPS-approved: AES-256, SHA-256 and Ed25519. Argon2 key derivation is the one exception, explained below.

Use	Algorithm	Standard
Project database (encrypted at rest, with per-page authentication)	AES-256 with HMAC, via SQLCipher	FIPS 197; FIPS 198-1
Each project’s master key	256 random bits from the operating system’s generator, handed to SQLCipher as a raw key	Operating-system random bit generator
Master-key protection and evidence-file encryption	AES-256-GCM	FIPS 197; NIST SP 800-38D
Report integrity hash and update verification	SHA-256	FIPS 180-4
Update-manifest signing	Ed25519	FIPS 186-5

Argon2: the key that wraps the master key is derived with Argon2, a modern and strong standard that is not a FIPS-approved key-derivation function.
These are FIPS-approved algorithms. The implementations are not FIPS 140-2/140-3 validated cryptographic modules.